

On the north side, Generaloberst Fedor von Bock’s Heeresgruppe B (43 divisions in four armies, plus two air-delivered divisions) was to cross the Maas/Meuse between Nijmegen and Namur and drive to the Channel coast. In the plan’s initial iterations the main thrust was to be through central Belgium with armoured, motorized troops on the northern wing, mountain troops advancing through the Ardennes on the southern flank, and airborne forces landing in the rear, near Ghent, to disrupt Allied mobile forces attempting to reinforce the Belgian front lines. These consisted of 56 infantry divisions deployed defensively to protect the Reich from attack by the French and British armies advancing through Belgium and southern Holland, reinforced by nine newly arrived or recently formed Panzer divisions. In order to meet Hitler’s demand for an offensive before winter, he developed a hasty plan that called for a direct frontal attack by the German forces then stationed in the west. This offensive must be launched at the earliest moment and in the greatest possible strength.’ Issued ten days later, and revised ten days after that, the army’s plan (Aufmarschanweisung Fall Gelb or ‘Deployment Directive, Case Yellow’) was produced under the direction of the OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres, the army high command) chief of staff General der Artillerie Franz Halder.

‘The enemy gains strength’, Hitler said, ‘and one winter night England and France will be on the Maas without firing a shot and without our knowing about it.’ Consequently, on 9 October, he directed the three service chiefs to plan a pre-emptive offensive campaign ‘on the northern flank of the Western front, through Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. Consequently, Hitler desperately wanted to defeat the impertinent western Allies before they had opportunity to recover from their ill-considered unpreparedness, enlist the support of neutral Belgium and Holland, and advance to Germany’s western frontier, thus threatening the Ruhr industrial basin and presaging a destructive defensive conflict on German soil.

The French Army’s half-hearted offensive into the Saar region (7–12 September) – a vain attempt to distract the Germans from completing their crushing campaign in Poland – only antagonized the Führer.
#Panzer corps 2 1940 campaign tree series#
ILLUSTRATED BY PETER DENNIS Series editor Marcus Cowper ILLUSTRATED BY PETER DENNIS © Osprey Publishing FALL GELB 1940 (1) Panzer breakthrough in the West
